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INTERNATIONAL UNIFORMITY IN
MARITIME LAW:
THE GOAL AND THE OBSTACLES
NICHOLAS J. HEALY*
That the genesis of private international law was in the mari-
time area is scarcely surprising when we recall that international
trade was at first conducted almost exclusively by sea. Because the
Mediterranean was the principal commercial highway of the West-
ern World, the customs adopted by the seafarers who sailed it and
the merchants they served evolved in time as a fairly uniform sys-
tem of supranational maritime jurisprudence. As the Italian port
cities began to prosper in the early Middle Ages, each adopted its
own maritime code, but because these compilations were derived
from the maritime customs of the Mediterranean, to a large extent
they were all similar.
The most significant of the codes was the Consolat de Mar -
the Consulate of the Sea - an elaborate compilation of judgments
promulgated in Barcelona, which was used as a corpusjuris or re-
statement of the maritime law and which had a profound effect on
its development. Thus, the right of a shipowner to limit the extent
of his liability for certain casualties - a right still recognized
throughout the maritime world - appears to have been established
for the first time in the Consolat de Mar.
The earliest compilation of maritime laws to emerge beyond
the Mediterranean was the "Rolls of Oleron," thought to have been
promulgated by Eleanor of Aquitaine. The Rolls became the nu-
cleus of the maritime laws, not only of France and England, but of
Flanders, Prussia, and Castile and were closely followed in the
Laws of Wisby, headquarters of the Hanseatic League until 1361.
The Rolls are occasionally cited as authority to this day, even by
United States courts.
A tendency away from uniformity in the maritime law, first
noticeable in the late Renaissance, was accelerated by the rise of
* Partner in Healy & Baille, New York City; Adjunct Professor of Law, New York
University.
1
Healy: International Uniformity in Maritime Law: The Goal and the Obstac
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1979
INTERNATIONAL UNIFORMITY IN MARITIME LAW
nationalism in the Seventeenth Century. The most significant of a
number of national codifications of maritime law promulgated dur-
ing this period was the Marine Ordinances of Louis XIV of France,
the substantive provisions of which were closely followed in the
Code de Commerce of 1807. The Code, however, treated maritime
law as part of the commercial law, to be administered by the com-
mercial courts rather than by the French Admiralty Court or the
consular courts which preceded it. The result was that thereafter
less attention was paid to the customs and usages of the sea in de-
ciding maritime disputes.
A movement to restore uniformity in the maritime law became
manifest during the late Nineteenth Century. Professor Mancini of
Turin pleaded that "the sea with its winds, storms, and dangers
does not change; it calls for a necessary uniformity of juridical re-
gimes," and at his suggestion the Italian Parliament, in 1863,
adopted a resolution in favor of reducing disparities between na-
tional maritime laws by international agreement. A decade later a
similar resolution was adopted by the Netherlands Parliament.
Meanwhile, in 1864 the British National Association for Social
Science drafted rules, intended for universal adoption, concerning
general average - the principle of maritime law ascribed to the
ancient Rhodians - whereby the parties to a maritime venture
who benefit by a jettison of cargo or other sacrifice, made to save
the venture as a whole from a marine peril, must contribute toward
the loss of the party whose property has been sacrificed. These
rules were followed by the adoption of the International Law Asso-
ciation's York/Antwerp Rules in 1890. While these Rules, which
were revised under the auspices of Le Comit Maritime Interna-
tional in 1924, 1950, and 1974, have never been made mandatory
by an international convention, they are incorporated by reference
in virtually every charter party and ocean bill of lading in use to-
day.
In 1896 Louis Franck of Antwerp founded the Belgian Associ-
ation of Maritime Law with the blessing of the International Law
Association. Several other national maritime law associations
modeled on the Belgian association were quickly formed, and in
1897 they joined together to form the International Maritime Com-
mittee, much better known, even in the English-speaking countries,
by its French name, Le Comitt Maritime International, or "C.M.I."
The Maritime Law Association of the United States was founded
two years later and became a constituent member of the C.M.I. as
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well as an affiliate of the American Bar Association, with a right of
representation in its House of Delegates.
The C.M.I. has continued to grow over the years and is now
composed of the national maritime law associations of some thirty-
three countries. While most of these are industrially developed,
some are not. The C.M.I. includes the maritime law associations of
not only the Western democracies, but the U.S.S.R., Poland, Yugo-
slavia, Bulgaria, and the German Democratic Republic.
The C.M.I. has pursued its goal of international uniformity,
not by attempting a comprehensive codification of all maritime law
but by drafting a series of conventions, each dealing with a particu-
lar area. Its efforts have met with remarkable success and have re-
sulted in twenty international conventions, most of which are now
in force.
The most widely accepted of these are the Brussels Conven-
tions on Collisions at Sea (1910), Assistance and Salvage at Sea
(1910), Limitation of Shipowners' Liability (1926 and 1957), Bills
of Lading (1924, commonly known as the Hague Rules), Maritime
Liens and Mortgages (1926), and the Arrest of Seagoing Ships
(1952). As their titles indicate, all of these conventions are con-
cerned with private international maritime law. But the C.M.I. has
on occasion busied itself with public law. Thus, it drafted the 1926
Convention on Immunity of State-owned Ships and the 1952 Con-
vention on Penal Jurisdiction in Matters of Collision, prompted by
the Lotus decision.
The C.M.I., as a private organization, obviously has no power
to bring any of its draft conventions into force. Happily, however,
in 1905 the Belgian government established the "Diplomatic Con-
ference on Maritime Law," sessions of which have been called from
time to time over the years to consider conventions drafted by the
C.M.I.
The last session of the Diplomatic Conference was held in
1967-68 for the purpose of considering C.M.I. draft conventions on
Registration of Rights in Vessels under Construction, Carriage of
Luggage, and Maritime Liens and Mortgages (designed to replace
the 1926 Convention), as well as protocols to the 1910. Salvage Con-
vention and the 1924 Convention on Bills of Lading.
Prior to 1967, the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative
Organization (IMCO) concerned itself with regulation of naviga-
tion, ship construction, and equipment - matters traditionally con-
sidered at the diplomatic conferences on safety of life at sea, held
Vol. 9
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periodically in London. In April of that year, crude oil from the
ruptured tanks of the Torrey Canyon caused pollution on an enor-
mous scale to the British and French coasts. Since the vessel was of
Liberian registry and the stranding occurred beyond Britain's terri-
torial sea and contiguous zone, the British government at first hesi-
tated to destroy the vessel in an effort to prevent the escape of
additional oil, although this is what was finally done. Both the
French and the British governments then spent huge sums in an
effort to clean up the pollution.
The British government was concerned with two problems
posed by the Torrey Canyon disaster. First, they wanted the re-
moval of any doubt about the right of a coastal state to do what was
finally done in the case of the Torrey Canyon, that is, to destroy
deliberately a foreign flag vessel while on the high seas in an effort
to avert or at least minimize serious pollution to the coastal state's
territorial waters and adjacent shores. Second, they were con-
cerned that in litigation to recover the costs of clean-up operations
a government might be met with a "good Samaritan" defense, inso-
far as such costs included amounts expended in removing oil from
privately owned waterfront property. The British government
therefore suggested that IMCO consider the formulation of conven-
tions designed to resolve these questions.
IMCO accepted the suggestion, and in November 1969 two oil
pollution conventions were signed at Brussels. The first, commonly
known as the Intervention Convention, governs the right of a
coastal state to protect its territorial waters and shorelines from the
consequences of a major oil spill by taking whatever action is nec-
essary, including destruction of the vessel. The second, commonly
called the Civil Liability Convention or C.L.C., imposes strict lia-
bility, limited in amount, for oil pollution damage as well as for the
costs of taking preventive measures, once there is a spill, and of
cleaning up such pollution as does occur. The C.M.I., as such, did
not participate in the drafting of the Intervention Convention, but
it had much to do with the C.L.C., and its assistance in preparing
the initial drafts of that Convention was welcomed by IMCO. The
C.L.C. has since been augmented by a so-called Fund Convention
signed at Brussels in 1971. This Convention establishes an interna-
tional fund of approximately $36 million, supported by a tax on oil,
from which oil pollution claimants may be compensated to the ex-
tent they are unable to recover under the C.L.C. All three Conven-
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tions are now in force, although the United States has thus far
ratified only the Intervention Convention.
The C.M.I. likewise prepared the initial drafts of a 1976 IMCO
Convention of Limitation of Liability, designed to update the 1957
Convention. Two draft conventions, both formulated at the 1977
C.M.I. Conference at Rio de Janerio, have been submitted to
IMCO for consideration. The first is a Convention on Jurisdiction,
Choice of Law, and Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in
Collision Cases, designed to replace the 1972 Convention on Civil
Jurisdiction, one of the few C.M.I. conventions which has not
gained wide acceptance. The second is a Convention on Offshore
Mobile Craft, designed to bring drilling rigs within the coverage of
various conventions relating to vessels. (In the United States, drill-
ing rigs are treated as vessels, but they are not so regarded in cer-
tain other states).
In addition to IMCO, which, while affiliated with the United
Nations, is not a part of that organization, two United Nations
commissions have taken an interest in the uniformity movement:
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UN-
CITRAL) and the United Nations Commission on Trade and De-
velopment (UNCTAD).
UNCITRAL's Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by
Sea, with relatively few significant changes, was adopted at a diplo-
matic conference held at Hamburg in March (1978). This Conven-
tion, which is not yet in force, is designed to replace the Brussels
Bills of Lading Convention of 1924.
The Needfor Uniformity
Those of us who have driven cars in the British Isles know that
every year a number of accidents occur because Americans and
other visitors from abroad have momentarily forgotten to drive on
the left. It would obviously be a good thing if some day we had
uniform driving rules, so that the next generation of drivers, at
least, would have no difficulty in remembering on which side of the
road they should drive, wherever they might happen to be.
In the maritime field, uniformity of the navigational rules gov-
erning the high seas is absolutely essential. One can imagine the
utter confusion that would result if the law of some flag states re-
quired a red light on the port side of a vessel and a green light on
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Long before there was any international convention governing
navigation at sea, the mariners themselves adopted certain customs
such as the custom of placing a red light on the port side of a vessel
and a green light on the starboard side and the custom requiring
meeting vessels to pass each other port side to port side. There does
not seem to have been any international treaty embodying these
and other navigational customs until the Nineteenth Century, when
France and Britain entered into a treaty governing the navigation
of vessels of each country. The first multilateral treaty regulating
navigation at sea was signed in Washington in 1899. Thereafter,
Britain took the lead, and the so-called "Collision Regulations" or
"Rules of the Road at Sea" were periodically revised by conven-
tions adopted at diplomatic conferences on Safety of Life at Sea
held at London. More recently, IMCO has taken over the responsi-
bility; the regulations now in force were adopted at a diplomatic
conference held in London in 1972, under IMCO's auspices.
In other maritime areas, while the need for uniformity may not
be quite as self-evident as in the case of high seas navigation, it is
still of vital importance, for a number of reasons. First of all, uni-
formity makes for ease in administration. Since ships move freely
from one country to another, it is by no means uncommon to have
litigation in State A concerning a collision or other casualty in the
territorial waters of State B, involving vessels of flag States C and
D. The courts and the lawyers of State A will obviously have an
easier time if the law governing not only the navigation of the ves-
sels but such matters as the effect of contributory fault and the
rights of owners of cargo damaged as a result of the collision is
common to all four states. If it is, there will be no need to incur the
trouble and expense of proving foreign law. Furthermore, settle-
ment will be facilitated if all concerned know that the law of all
four states is the same.
Secondly, uniformity results in a reduction of "forum shop-
ping". Thus, prior to 1975 the American law in collision cases pro-
vided for an equal division of damages in "both-to-blame" cases,
regardless of the respective degrees of fault chargeable to the ves-
sels involved. The law of the United Kingdom and most of the
other major maritime powers is the 1910 Collision Convention,
which incorporates the proportional fault rule. In 1975, the
Supreme Court abandoned the American equal division rule and
adopted the proportional fault rule, thus bringing American law
into line with that of the 1910 Convention countries, insofar as con-
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cerns the division of damages between colliding vessels in both-to-
blame cases. The result was the elimination of a certain amount of
forum shopping in collision cases. However, it has not been elimi-
nated altogether because of the differences between the American
law of limitation of liability and the law of other maritime coun-
tries which have adopted the 1957 Limitation of Liability Conven-
tion.
A third reason why uniformity is desirable is that ocean carri-
ers and merchants who ship goods by sea know what risks to insure,
and marine insurers know how to fix premiums if there is uniform-
ity in the laws governing carriage of goods by sea, marine collision,
limitation of liability, and liability for water pollution.
If we accept the principle that uniformity in international
marine law is desirable, why has it not long since been completely
achieved? There are several obstacles standing in the way. First of
all, there are now 150 or so sovereign states, some developed and
some not; the days are of course gone forever when delegates of the
United Kingdom or France could each sign a convention on behalf
of scores of colonies. Obtaining a consensus is therefore much
more difficult than it was before World War II, and the difficulty is
enhanced by natural suspicion, on the part of the developing coun-
tries, of proposals made by the more highly industrialized states.
Thus, although the C.M.I. includes the national maritime law as-
sociations of a number of Iron Curtain countries and those of some
of the developing countries, including India, it is still regarded in
some of the developing countries as a kind of rich men's club, be-
cause the first national associations to join the C.M.I. were those of
highly developed countries such as the United Kingdom, France,
Belgium, and the United States.
A second obstacle is the abandonment of the gold standard
and the high rates of inflation, which have prevailed in so many
countries for such a long period. Like the Warsaw Convention, a
number of maritime conventions provide for limitations of liability
expressed in terms of Poincar6 gold francs. These include the 1926
and 1957 Conventions on Limitation of Liability, the 1924 Conven-
tion on Bills of Lading, and the 1969 Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage.
The C.M.I. is presently endeavoring to find a solution to the
gold-standard problem, which may take the form of protocols to
existing conventions to substitute Special Drawing Rights for Poin-
Vol. 9
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car6 francs. When and if the 1976 Convention on Limitation of
Liability enters into force it would do the same.
The gold-standard problem is not as formidable as inflation.
Thus, limits of liability that were considered realistic in 1957, when
the Limitation of Liability Convention presently in force in most of
the important maritime countries was adopted, are not realistic to-
day. Limits could, of course, be adjusted periodically by protocols
designed to reflect inflation, but having a protocol ratified by a sub-
stantial number of maritime states is so time-consuming a process
that by the time widespread adoption is achieved, so much further
inflation may have intervened as to render the protocol out of date.
Perhaps the answer lies in providing in new conventions, and
in protocols to existing conventions, for periodic increases in limits
based upon findings concerning inflation made by an international
organization such as IMCO. This might, however, present consti-
tutional problems in some countries, including the United States.
Still another obstacle is the unwillingness of some states to sur-
render jurisdiction to the courts of certain other states, or to recog-
nize and enforce their judgments. For example, an EEC country
may be willing to surrender its jurisdiction to another EEC coun-
try's courts in certain instances, and to enforce their judgments, but
may not be happy about the thought of surrendering jurisdiction to
the courts of some other states; for example, those.of certain Iron
Curtain countries and certain developing countries that do not have
a long tradition in the administration of maritime law.
Finally, a major obstacle to the goal of uniformity is the reluc-
tance of the United States to subscribe to international maritime
conventions. This country has so far ratified only two of the C.M.I.
conventions - the 1910 Salvage Convention and the 1924 Conven-
tion on Bills of Lading. We have not adopted any of the Limitation
of Liability Conventions, the Arrest of Ships Convention, the Con-
ventions on Maritime Liens and Mortgages, or the 1952 Conven-
tions on Penal Jurisdiction and Civil Jurisdiction in Collision
Cases. Nor has the United States subscribed to either the Conven-
tion on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage or the Fund Con-
vention. We have not adopted the 1910 Collision Convention,
although the Supreme Court has made the proportional fault rule
of that Convention part of the general maritime law of the United
States.
Why this reluctance on the part of the United States? First of
all, there may be a certain "pride of authorship" on the part of
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some senators, who appear to believe that an existing act of Con-
gress, particularly one that they sponsored, is necessarily preferable
to a proposed international convention governing the same subject
matter.
A bad convention should not, of course, be adopted merely for
the sake of uniformity. But it is submitted that it is usually prefera-
ble to accept a convention embodying rules almost as good as we
conceive our own to be if it will make for international uniformity.
Secondly, there appears to be a tendency on the part of some
senators, and some officers of the State Department, to reject con-
ventions regulating liability in the maritime field on the ground
that they do not go far enough; for example, the Civil Liability
Convention, the Fund Convention, and the 1957 and 1976 Limita-
tion of Liability Conventions. In some instances, the result is that
we keep on our books laws which do not go even as far as a pro-
posed convention because some senators are advocating "tougher"
laws, although they have been unable to persuade their colleagues
in the Senate and the House to enact them.
Still another reason is the tendency on the part of some sena-
tors and other people in government to give the individual states a
more or less free hand in the maritime area. Both the American
Bar Association and the Maritime Law Association of the United
States have in recent years adopted resolutions deploring the
proliferation of state laws in the maritime field and advocating na-
tional uniformity, without which international uniformity is of
course impossible to achieve. In the past few years there have been
a few encouraging signs, but much remains to be done before we
have a completely national maritime law.
What can be done to overcome the obstacles to uniformity? It
is submitted that, in the national sphere, there should be closer liai-
son between private organizations, such as the American Bar Asso-
ciation and its affiliate, the Maritime Law Association of the United
States, on the one hand, and the governmental agencies, particu-
larly the State Department, the Department of Transportation, the
Federal Maritime Commission, and the Maritime Administration,
on the other. In the international field, there should be closer liai-
son between private and public agencies, specifically, between the
C.M.I. and IMCO, UNCITRAL and UNCTAD.
Such liaison would lead to mutual trust and a better under-
standing of the problems facing both the national and the interna-
Vol. 9
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tional governmental agencies and the various groups concerned
with carriage of goods and passengers by water. A better under-
standing will, in turn, lead to greater international uniformity in the
maritime law.
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